To neutralize severe highway safety risks tied to manipulated electronic logs, the ATA safety committee has proposed a comprehensive overhaul featuring stricter federal oversight and independent third-party ELD testing.
- Safety Crisis: Fleets flagged for ELD tampering experience a 56% higher reportable crash rate and significantly elevated out-of-service violation rates.
- Short-Term Actions: The ATA recommends implementing automated algorithmic checks on electronic records of duty status (RODS) and requiring a verified U.S.-based footprint for all device-registering companies.
- Long-Term Certification: The proposal outlines a multi-tiered third-party certification framework, partnering with accredited entities and independent experts to evaluate ELD software.
- Sustained Compliance: Recommendations include regular lifecycle audits, software update touchpoints, and technical requirement reviews to ensure ongoing regulatory compliance.
Faced with surging safety threats tied to hours-of-service manipulation, the American Trucking Associations (ATA) is pressing federal regulators to overhaul the nation's electronic logging device system through mandatory third-party oversight and rigorous digital surveillance.
ATA's Safety Policy Committee on Tuesday laid out six core recommendations for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to secure the electronic logging device (ELD) ecosystem.
“No system will eliminate every attempt at fraud, but we can make cheating significantly more difficult and costly,” said Kevin Grove, ATA Director of Safety & Technology Policy. “FMCSA has already demonstrated its commitment to meeting this challenge. The next step is to give the agency a stronger, lasting framework to protect the integrity of ELDs and hours-of-service compliance."
1. Implement checks on ERODS for common indicators of fraud
Data from the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) shows that fleets receiving ELD tampering violations have a 56% higher reportable crash rate.
The ATA recommended that FMCSA run automated algorithmic checks on electronic records of duty status (RODS).
"This would allow FMCSA to have better visibility into currently registered devices and maintain visibility in the interim until a third-party certification program is set up," the ATA working group wrote in its report.
These checks would flag outlying circumstances like impossible distances, out-of-sequence file numbers, and driver information manipulation, triggering human review. ATA specified that these automated checks should be handled by the agency rather than deployed at roadside enforcement checkpoints.
2. Require a verified U.S. footprint for device registration
To ensure proper legal accountability, all companies registering devices must maintain a verified footprint within the United States. The ATA working group suggested modeling this requirement after existing National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) processes, such as Part 551 designated agents or Part 591 import declarations.
"FMCSA must be able to hold entities accountable in the event of non-compliance or fraud. By requiring all companies registering devices to have a verified U.S.-based footprint, FMCSA and/or law enforcement will have the necessary tools when they investigate," ATA wrote.
3. Maintain and improve FMCSA responsiveness and enforcement tools
Acknowledging limited agency resources, the ATA called on Congress to fund additional staff and financial backing to the FMCSA and recommended establishing formal, trackable processes for law enforcement to report fraud, noting that the current ELDTech email address is "is not sufficient as an enforcement/investigation tool."
"FMCSA needs to be responsive to reports of ELD fraud, particularly those from law enforcement. This is the last line of defense both in short- and long-term plans to address fraud... FMCSA should create a formal process for law enforcement reporting which tracks reports from creation to resolution."
4. Build a robust third-party certification program
Calling it a "necessary step for addressing future potential for ELD fraud," ATA called for moving away from the current self-certification model and creating a multi-tiered third-party certification framework. Under this structure, FMCSA would retain regulatory and enforcement power while contracting with an accrediting entity and independent certification providers to focus primarily on ELD software technical reviews.
"A certification structure creates strong disincentives and barriers to fraud by introducing hurdles to entering the market with the intent of fraud, frequent touch points which increase the likelihood of fraud being detected, and better visibility into the ecosystem for investigating fraud," ATA wrote.
The system would draw structural inspiration from the Canadian ELD model while remaining customized for the U.S. market. Canada requires mandatory third-party testing and certification through accredited certification bodies approved by the Minister of Transport
National Motor Freight Traffic Association Chief Operating Officer Joe Ohr noted to CCJ that while the U.S. currently has nearly 1,000 self-certified ELDs on its registry, Canada has less than 50.
5. Sustain compliance and plan for lifecycle recertification
ATA recommended lifecycle safeguards to maintain oversight and keep certification from becoming a one-and-done event, including regular device reviews (such as reviewing 25% of requirements annually like the Canadian model), periodic audits of certification providers, and incorporating ELD information directly into motor carrier MCS-150 forms.
This lifecycle recertification approach, ATA theorized, facilitates continued compliance and ensures FMCSA maintains visibility as devices and technologies evolve. Non-ELD software updates would require standard touchpoints with certifiers without mandating complete recertification.
6. Continuously review technical requirements
As technologies and evasion tactics evolve, ATA recommended that the FMCSA systematically update technical requirements to reduce ambiguity and enhance fraud detection.
"FMCSA should plan how updates will impact the certification process to ensure smooth transitions when new requirements take effect... FMCSA should consider how the technical requirements can be revised to both reduce ambiguity in interpretation and facilitate future certification processes," ATA wrote.
ATA encouraged ATA to introduce flexibility for features like geofencing to minimize legitimate changes to RODS, thereby making fraudulent alterations easier to identify.





















